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【Abstract】
Aiming at clarifying the European Union (the EU)'s decision making process of its China policy,
this paper scrutinizes previous researches and documents on the decision making process of the EU
especially on EU's China policy and thusly contributes to studies on EU-China relations.
EU is a regional organization which evolves by time. Since its foundation in 1958, it expanded
from a loosely structured economic cooperation with 6 member states, to an in‰uential political
organization with independent military power and 27 member states. During this process, while EU
adopted new institutional structures and new member states as well as numerous new laws and
regulations, how EU uses its current regulations to implement its previous policies and how new
EU member states interpret policies inherited from EU became interesting questions. For example,
European Communities (the EC) had an arms embargo on China, declared in 1989. As EU's former
body EC, with its 12 member states, it put nothing more than a political will on the embargo; there
was no legally binding instrument for arms embargo. However comparing with the EC at the time,
currently EU has 15 more member states, how should they interpret the embargo? EU adopted a
legally binding Common Position on Arms Exports in 2008, how should it be used to explain EC's
arms embargo on China since 1989? In 2003 some member states were trying to lift EU's arms
embargo on China, what procedure should be followed? Plus new institutional in‰uences and the
ever-changing international political climate, a review of the critical in‰uences and limits to EU's
policy making on China is necessary.
This paper will ˆrstly review the in‰uences of several signiˆcant actors to EU policy making and
――
1 The EC published a declaration on Tiananmen Incident on 27th June, 1989. Some of the EC member states
also published declarations or other forms of comments individually, such as French foreign minister Roland
Dumas saying he was `dismayed by the bloody repression' and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
saying `appalled by the indiscriminate shooting of unarmed people'. `World condemns Bloodshed', Eugene
Register-Gauard, 5th June, 1989, p.5A
2 Akihiko Tanaka, 1990, `Tenanmon Jiken Igo no Chugoku o Meguru Kokusai Kankyo' [The international
environment of the post-Tiananmen China], Kokusai Mondai, No.358, pp.4143
discuss their performances in cases such as China arms embargo debate, the making of Code of
Conduct, and regulation on lobbying. In the conclusion of this paper, it will be argued that EU
foreign policy is detaching from its traditional loyalty to the US, though the US is still the most
signiˆcant in‰uence to EU, even to its China policy. An independent, interest-focused pro-China
force within EU―which is a combination of several actors―is emerging to counter the in‰uence of
the US. This force remains secondary at the moment; however it can be critical when more actors
are gathered together for its use.
【Key Words】 European Council, European Parliament, Lobbying, Arms Embargo, the Code of
Conduct
Introduction
The complexity of the decision making process of the European Union is phenomenal. Regarding
to EU's foreign policy decision making, the complexity is even doubled, as EU member states have
to get through a foreign policy making process ˆrst internally. In other words, rather than usual
foreign relation, which is a country vis-a-vis another, countries also deploy diplomacy and compete
for in‰uences within EU. In some special cases, individuals, interest groups, parties, governments
and institutions all can be critically signiˆcant to EU's foreign policy. This paper focuses on EU's
decision making process of its foreign policy, particularly on a series of issues revolving EU's arms
embargo on China and tries to clarify the signiˆcance of each in‰uential actors to EU's policy
makers.
EU has inherited arms embargo on China from European Communities since 1989 Tiananmen
Incident. On 4th June, 1989, the Chinese government used military to expel students and other
demonstrators on Tiananmen Square, which caused an unidentiˆed number of casualties. As a
condemnation to such an act, many western countries and organization put embargoes on China,
including some EC member states, EC and the US.1 Shortly after the embargo, as a result of
Chinese government's eŠort at easing international tension and western countries' worries about an
isolated China, most embargoes were lifted except arms embargoes.2
――
3 The US Republican head of the senate foreign relations committee warned that US would sanction Europe;
Democratic leader Joseph Biden said the lifting was a `non-starter with Congress'. Julian Borger and Nicholas
Watt, 2005, `Europe risks US sanctions over China arms sales', The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2005/mar/03/china.eu, accessed 7th April, 2012
4 Steven R. Weisman, 2005, `EU Said to Keep Embargo on Arms to China', The New York Times, http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/03/22/politics/22diplo.html?_r＝1, accessed 7th April, 2012
5 A rational choice is presumably the best choice to achieve the maximization of a country's interests. Speciˆ-
cally speaking, the choice is considered to be the best way to save costs economically and politically, and
enlarge the beneˆt it brings out.
Until 2012, the arms embargo lasted for more than 23 years. From EC to EU, the embargo was
never more than a political declaration, which barely attracted any attention to it until recent 10
years. In 2003, EU decided to develop a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, for which
EU decided to lift its arms embargo on China in the same year. The decision met very little
resistance within EU; EU member countries assumed that the embargo was to be lifted very soon.
However, very few if any, anticipated that the US would soon wage a huge campaign against EU's
lifting embargo; not to mention that the US congress threated to embargo the EU.3 Due to the US
pressure, the EU gave up its plan to lift the embargo.4
The US has a good reason against EU's lifting the embargo: the US military is possibly going to
confront Chinese military in Asia. In comparison to the arms embargo of EU, the US has a fully
detailed legally-binding arms embargo on China. Started from the same point with EU, the US put
the embargo on China as a political gesture of condemnation at the ˆrst place; however the US
congress made a swift action afterwards and legalized the embargo. After the end of the Cold War,
the US found the embargo necessary as the US has strategic con‰icts with China in East Asian
geopolitics. Especially after Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 and China's declaration of `Peaceful Rise'
in 2002, the US has felt that it is urgently needed to keep Chinese' military rise under control, and
persuade EU to take further actions to make its arms embargo detailed and legally binding.
Therefore EU's dilemma is a problem of adjusting its policy between the thirst for better eco-
nomic relations with China, and the necessity of protecting pre-existed interests of alliance. In this
dilemma, how EU made its decisions on China policy, how EU has been in‰uenced by other actors,
and what is indicated from EU's decision making pattern are urgently needed to be clariˆed. This
paper focuses on these needs and makes an attempt to contribute to the studies on EU's China
policy.
EU: Rational Choice Maker?
It is critical to deˆne and clarify whether the EU is a rational choice maker or not, as diŠerent in-
terest orientation may induce totally contrary foreign policies.5 In terms of the EU's relation with
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6 A few countries are holding up moral high grounds on HRD such as Sweden and Finland, even though they
both once conceded and gave their permission of lifting arms embargo for a boost of China-EU relation. Other
countries either actively seek to promote China-EU relation, or comply with the mainstream opinion of the
EU.
7 The current voting system lasts until 2014, when the EU shift most of its policy making area to Double
Majority Voting (DMV), which is a variation of QMV.
China, if the EU is majorly morality-oriented or ideology-driven, the EU might put Human Rights
and Democratization (HRD) as a priority to actual interests; if the EU is a rational decision maker
and seek economic interests and political in‰uence prior to protecting other values, it would allo-
cate its resources to promoting its relation with China regardless to cost in other areas. Given the
importance of the EU's interest orientation, this section will identify decision making organs of the
EU and in‰uential factors to it, and further qualify if the EU is a rational choice maker or not.
From the perspective of the EU's composition, EU should be a rational choice maker because it
is a union of rational choice makers. As a supranational organization, the EU is composed of 27
member states; at least the majority of the member states are rational choice makers, which are
driven by economic or political interests.6 The EU institutions serve as `agents' or `servants' for the
EU member states. Therefore theoretically the EU should be a rational choice maker, as it
represents its member states' preferences of interests. However as a matter of fact, it does not
always act to maximise its member states' interests for two reasons: ˆrst, the EU institutions are
too large to be monitored by any single country. In other words, with limited resources, a country
cannot monitor every aspect of a multi-tasking institution. Any EU institution is huge enough to
play oŠ one group of its member states against another, get rid of the control of its `masters' and
promote what itself considers as priority. Second, in some situations unanimity is required and in
some others Qualiˆed Majority Voting (QMV) is required.7 Therefore for issues require unanimity,
a veto of one single country may cause non-decision of the EU institutions. In this situation it is
necessary to maximise each countries' interests, otherwise it will cause the `irrational choice' of the
EU. In situations requiring QMV, it is important to motivate both in‰uential member states and the
decision making EU institutions, as they lead the EU policy direction. Regarding the EU's China
policies, most foreign policy decisions shall be applied to unanimity with very few exceptions of
QMV, and the lifting of arms embargo on China requires unanimity, consequently the EU may not
act as rational as it should be.
Other than the member states, EU's institutions may also suŠer from EU level restrains. The
European Commission (the Commission), the European Council, the European Parliament (the
EP) and the Council of the European Union (the Council), to constrain any one of them it takes the
collective eŠort of the rest.
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8 This role is overlapped by the European Council and the Council, which will be discussed in later sections.
9 `Commissioners are sworn to abandon all national allegiances during their tenure of o‹ce, and they are
bound by the principle of collegiality, so all actions are the responsibility of the Commission as a whole.' Ian
Bache, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer, 2011, Politics in the European Union, Oxford Univ Pr (Sd), p.259
The principle governing body is the European Commission, which works similar to but not
exactly the same as the government of a country. It is said so because the Commission implements
policies but does not provide political directions; rather, the European Council, which was o‹cially
an institution in the EU since 2009 the Lisbon Treaty, provides the EU with political guidelines.
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union together play the role as the
parliament to a country. It is worth noting that neither the EP nor the Council can initiate constrain-
ing legislative procedures independently. A complete process of policy implementation is that the
European Council proposes directions to the Commission, the Commission proposes and consult
policies to the Council and the EP, the Council and the EP pass it and leave the Commission to
execute it. If it is a purely political issue the European Council and the Council may make decisions,
with consultation to the Commission and the EP.
Among the institutions above, the Commission is supposed to be a neutral mediator among insti-
tutions and countries. The EP represents the opinions of the European people. In comparison to the
Europeanness and the conscientiousness of the Commission and the EP, national interests and
European interests are being represented at the European Council and the Council of the European
Union. Hereby we can see that depending on the characteristics of cases, the policy orientation of
the EU is very much relied on how big the decision making power of the European Council and the
Council is, and how much their power can be refrained by other institutions, if not being advanced.
In the following sections, detailed discussions will be conducted to evaluate the power and in‰uence
of each actor related to the EU decision making of its China policy.
The European Commission
The European Commission can initiate drafts for legislations, manage budgets, mediate between
institutions and the EU member states, install policies and monitor policy implementations. Notice-
ably, it also serves a role as the authority of the EU, which manages the external relations of the
EU especially economically, and represents as the voice of the EU.8 Nonetheless, being the authori-
ty, the Commission has been refrained from in‰uencing the EU's policies. The Commission has
been kept neutral and remains as a mediator among institutions.9
In case of China policy, the Commission as an entity has some in‰uence over small countries,
which often follow the advices of the Commissioners.10 Nonetheless advising is not the o‹cial func-
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10 John Fox and Francois Godement, 2009, A Power Audi of EU-China Relations, European Council on Foreign
Relations, p.27
11 Daniel Marc Cohn-Bendit, Nelly Maes and Per Gahrton, 2003, European Parliament Session Document Mo-
tion for a Resolution B50552/03
12 The European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso once supported EU's action of lifting the arms
embargo against China. He soon changed his position after being criticized by the European Parliament. `The
European Union is moving to lift the arms embargo. The European Union cannot be accused of rushing into
this.', Barroso, 10th February, 2005, `EU set to lift China arms embargo despite US concerns', euobserver,
http://euobserver.com/24/18375, accessed 11th April, 2012; `Barroso emphasized that he did not want to in-
volve himself in the debate, and stated that it was not the responsibility of the European Commission to de-
cide on such matters.', `EU Parliament Says No to Lifting Arms Embargo on China', 15th April, 2005, IT-
NSource, http://www.itnsource.com/en/jp/shotlist/RTV/2005/04/15/504140015/?s＝, accessed 11th
April, 2012
13 European Union, 2006, `Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community', O‹cial Journal of the European Union C321, p.135
tion of the Commission. As the EU adopts treaties (the Lisbon Treaty in particular), the Commis-
sion, its president and its commissioners have been challenged and changing over time. In this sec-
tion, a review will be conducted to clarify the role of the Commission on general and speciˆcally on
the aspects of its in‰uence to the EU's China policy.
The authority of the Commission has been increasingly challenged in the years after the Lisbon
Treaty. One source of the challenge comes from the European Parliament. The members of the
European Parliament (the MEPs) can have very diŠerent and contrary views to the EU policy
makers, and therefore in‰uence the Commission's attitude.11 The MEPs may bring their views into
the working groups, delegations or committees within the EP, where various in‰uences are being
gathered and formed. One example could be that the Commission once showed support to lifting
the arms embargo on China, but soon it changed its position to a secondary role to avoid criticism
from the EP.12 Furthermore, the EP also has the power to rectify the Commissioners' appointment.
The authority of the Commission has also been challenged by the European Council and the
Council of the European Union. The European Council is where heads of all the EU member states
gather; once it focuses on a common interest of the EU member states, it may exert great political
momentum to form policies. The Council, composed by respective ministers, usually cooperate
with the European Council on critical issues. Until the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, although
the Commission was running the EU as its `government', actually its power has always been con-
ceded from the Council. The Council theoretically had the power to terminate policies or attach
conditions to the Commission's use of power.13 After the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission ˆnally
took over the executive rights from the Council, but the con‰icting functions and positions between
the Commission and the European Council has become a new topic for debates.14 For example,
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14 Andrew DuŠ, 2010, `Who is Herman Van Rompuy?', Financial Times, http://andrewduŠ.eu/en/article/2010
/042378/who-is-herman-van-rompuy, accessed 8th April, 2012
15 K. De Gucht, 2003, `The European Commission: Countdown to Extinction?', European Integration, 25, p.165,
cited in Ian Bache, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer, 2011, Politics in the European Union, Oxford Univ Pr
(Sd), p.261
16 High Representative of the Union for Foreign AŠairs and Security Policy can also be shorted as `High
Representative'. Catherine Ashton can also be addressed as `Lady Ashton' or `Baroness Ashton'.
before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had two mutually non-interfering presidencies: one president for
the Commission and a rotating president country for the European Council and the Council of Euro-
pean Union. After the Treaty there is a permanent president of the European Council, currently
Herman Van Rompuy, and his work overlaps parts of the president of the Commission, especially
on foreign policy. Fortunately both of the presidents have no rights of voting on policies, so far they
mean to keep a low proˆle and draw no unnecessary attention to the Union, especially on problems
relevant to China.
All in all, the Commission was never designed to in‰uence policy making process of the EU;
rather, it has been design to neutrally mediate. However from two perspectives it is becoming
in‰uential to policy making. First is its endangered political autonomy from other EU institutions
and EU member states. After the Lisbon Treaty, on one hand EP has a tendency of forming its own
opinion, and on the other the European Council and the Council have a similar political aspiration to
the Commission; some scholar pessimistically argued that the independency of the Commission is
facing extinction.15 Such weakening of the Commission indicates a turning point in the EU decision
making, which is that the Commission may have to start to in‰uence policies of the EU in competi-
tion for power.
Second noticeable change in the Commission is the formal establishment of the High Representa-
tive of the Union for Foreign AŠairs and Security Policy (the HRUFASP), currently occupied by
Catherine Ashton.16 The HRUFASP strengthened the Commission's role in its China policy deci-
sion making, as she works across three EU institutions. She has a 5-year term as other commission-
ers, sits in the meetings of the European Council, works as the vice president of the Commission
and the chairwoman of the Council of Foreign AŠairs under the European Council, which directly
forms the foreign policy of the EU.
As a conclusion of this section, speaking of the Commission, principle challenges are from the EU
level, and its in‰uence is mainly being casted by the HRUFASP Lady Ashton. In the next section,
the discussion will be on how the European Council and the Council in‰uence the EU's foreign
policy.
――
17 The European Council and the Council already existed before the Lisbon Treaty, but the European Council
was not o‹cially taken as a part of EU until the Treaty. European Union, 2010, `Consolidated Versions of the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union', O‹cial Journal of the
European Union C83, p.22
18 Consensus is necessary regarding external issues, in order to provide greatest protection to national
sovereignty of each member state. European Union, 2010, `Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union', O‹cial Journal of the European Union C83,
p.23
The European Council and the Council of the European Union
The European Council and the Council of the European Union, as two confusingly similarly
named organizations, have totally diŠerent functions yet strong connections with each other. In this
section the European Council and the Council will be introduced with reference to each other, in the
context of their function within EU and their contribution to EU's China policy.
The strong tie between the European Council and the Council was historically inherited. Before
the installation of the Lisbon Treaty the European Council and the Council could be viewed as one
council system. The previous `council system', was actually a cooperation mechanism in each
aspect: member states' presidents or premiers met for political directions of the EU, foreign
ministers met for external political issues of the EU, agricultural ministers met on ˆshery issues,
and so forth. The Lisbon Treaty speciˆed and divided works of the previous council system, by
o‹cially splitting the system into two parts: one part is the European Council, a summit for the EU
leaders; the other is the Council, the consultation system for all sorts of issues.17 Hereby it is not
hard to understand that the European Council and the Council share many things in common: they
used to share same presidency, even now in the absence of a president for the European Council,
the president of the Council may take the acting power; for the rest, they still share things from
political preference to o‹ce buildings.
The strength of the European Council is that although it has not much power to enforce anything,
it points out the political directions for the EU, regardless to the di‹culty of ˆnding consensus on
almost everything including China policies. The European Council is composed of all leaders of the
EU member states, plus its own president, the Commission president, and the High Representa-
tive. It is a meeting of all high-proˆle politicians of EU. Except presidents of the EU member
states, the rest EU leaders have no power to vote in the European Council, but only rights to voice
opinions and manage consensus.18 Therefore it can be imagined that ˆnding a consensus among 27
characteristic national leaders is very di‹cult. Several favourable conditions for ˆnding consensus
are: one, large common interests and small counter-balancing from the outside of the European
――
19 The rotating presidency had greater in‰uence to the EU agenda before the Lisbon Treaty; its in‰uence has
been diluted by the current High Representative. CSDP is a part of the CFSP; CSDP used to be called Euro-
pean Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) before the Lisbon Treaty.
20 The relation between the Foreign AŠairs Council and the EEAS is like the relation between the European
Council and the Commission: the Foreign AŠairs Council is in charge of policy making, while the EEAS is
functional and it makes sure of policy implementation.
Council; two, a consensus among a few large countries' leaders, and their lobbying eŠorts on the
others; three, EU leaders' in‰uence to small countries' political preference. In such settings, as the
representation of the `conscientiousness' of the EU―the Commission participants have no power
and there is no European Parliament representation; lobbying of member states emerged to be
signiˆcant in‰uence, and with agreeable attitude of EU leaders, a political direction will be set.
Unlike the European Council, the Council is not composed of permanent members. It is struc-
tured by many sub-sections of meetings of respective o‹cials from member states. The Council is
critically in‰uential to the EU foreign relations with China in two ways: ˆrst is that its rotating
presidency country may put pro-China agenda onto the EU table if it favours so domestically;
second, it contains the Foreign AŠairs Council, which deals with the EU's international relations.
Most signiˆcantly Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) are directed by the Foreign AŠairs Council.19
The Foreign AŠairs Council is chaired by the vice president of the Commission Catherine
Ashton, who is also the head of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU delega-
tions to other countries. The EEAS is a department working as the foreign ministry of the EU,
independent of any EU institutions, though it was merged from the external relations departments
of the Council and the European Commission before the Lisbon Treaty.20 As one can see, Lady
Ashton is playing one of the key roles in in‰uencing the EU's policy on China; her in‰uence extends
across the European Council, the Commission, the Council and the `Foreign Ministry' of EU. Spe-
ciˆcally, her opinion is valued by small countries in the European Council, she is the vice president
of the Commission, she is chairing the Foreign AŠairs Council of the EU, and she is also leading the
EEAS as an independent department.
So far it is identiˆed that the European Council and the High Representative Catherine Ashton
are the main sources of in‰uence to the foreign policy making and China policy making of the EU.
In the next section, the role of the EP will be discussion regarding to China policy.
The European Parliament
Among all the EU institutions, the European Parliament has been the most democratic. Its power
has been improved by time yet very limited regarding policy making, as it should be. Currently, the
――
21 Ian Bache, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer, 2011, Politics in the European Union, Oxford Univ Pr (Sd),
p.234
22 Although some MEP argued that it was an `accident'. Tim King, 2008, `The power of Parliament―a matter
of chance', EuropeanVoice, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/the-power-of-parliament-a-mat-
ter-of-chance/61248.aspx, accessed 8th April, 2012
23 Brigid LaŠan, 1997, The Finances of the European Union, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Macmillan
Press, p.82
24 Ian Bache, Stephen George and Simon Bulmer, 2011, Politics in the European Union, Oxford Univ Pr (Sd),
pp.296297
EP's power ranges from approval of EU budgets and EU level occupational appointments, super-
vising the Council and the Commission by rights of questioning, dismissal and receiving reports,
and legislative co-decision shared with the Council. The above rights are not directly connected
with policy making, nonetheless it is still causing discussion on whether the power of the EP is
inappropriately large or not, because the in‰uence of the EP is being extended into many
undeserved areas, such as foreign policy. How the EP managed it so far? In this section the EP's
power will be discussed in regard to how it restrains and challenges other EU institutions, and how
it in‰uences the EU decision making process.
The EP used to have extremely limited power in decision making. As argued by the some scho-
lars, the Council had the obligation to consult the EP for advice, but the EP's opinion was nothing
more than ignorable.21 It was since 1975, when the EP was granted with the budgetary power,
situations started to change. Since the EP had the power to limit and approve budgets of the EU, in
1979, the EP blocked the Council's budget of 1980, which means that the Council mostly had to
survive on its own. It was the ˆrst warning to the Council that the EP should not be ignored in any
case.22 Similarly in 1982, the EP once set budgets which exceeded limitations, and used it as
leverage for restrictive measures on the Council. In 1985, the EP went out of its power range,
added amendments to reduce the budget of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), in order to
extend punishment to CAP for being hindrance to new common policy of EC. As consequences of
these incidents, the EP reached backstage deals with the Council for ceasing the confrontation.23
There were also many cases like such between the EP and the Commission, and other than budge-
tary methods legislative measures are also available, which will not be elaborated further. It was
until 1988, inter-institutional agreement was reach to stop the EP from using budgetary threats,
and since 2009 the Lisbon Treaty the EP was set to share equal rights with the Council, therefore
the power of the EP can be restrained.
Nevertheless, the EP has never stopped seeking for more power. On general, so far it has been
argued that the EP has several tools to boost its power: ˆrst is the lobbying activity.24 Some
members of the EP (MEPs) have acted as interest groups, worked at EU level and national level to
――
25 Committee on Foreign AŠairs has employed its acronym from French, which is `AŠaires etrangeres'. Its sub-
committees also used similar naming pattern: Committee on Human Rights (DROI, Droit de l'homme); Com-
mittee on Security and Defence (SEDE, Securite et defense). AFET: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/com-
mittees/en/AFET/home.html, accessed 27th March, 2012
press for the endowment of more power to the EP. Second, referring to the argument of the
`democratic deˆcit'―which means that all leaders at EU institutions are not being democratically
elected except for the MEPs―deˆcit should be made up by giving more and more power to the
only democratic institution, which is the EP. Third, is to execute current power with a maximalist
approach. MEPs have found allies at the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and interpreted EU
treaties and constitutions in a way to maximize its power rather than minimal approach.
In terms of foreign policy and the China policy of the EU, which is not an area that of the EP's
charge, the EP particularly has been using three tools to increase its in‰uence, which are: the
Foreign AŠairs Committee (AFET) and its sub-committees; is its Delegation to China and other
countries; its rapporteurs and reports.25
The EP actively seeks to present itself on the international stage. As it deˆned the AFET, it is
the EP institution which is correspondent to the CFSP; it aims at managing the EP relation with
other EU institutions and international actors; it strengthens EP relations with other countries; it is
in charge of EU enlargement; it promotes human rights and democracy. It should be known that
the AFET does not provide much policy output to other institutions; rather, it supplies the EP with
information and opinions. Despite of its powerless nature, it is still critical as it signals and directs
the political preference of the EP and the MEPs, because many MEPs are not concerned or
majored in diplomacy.
The EP Delegation to China, along with other delegations is in‰uential to the EP opinions too.
The AFET provides political preferences on general; the delegations works on speciˆc issues and
countries. The delegations of the EP shall not be confused with the delegations of the EEAS, which
are under the control of the High Representative and work as the `embassy of the EU'. The EP
delegations mainly maintain and promote the relations between the EP and another non-EU coun-
try. Likewise the AFET, the delegation is important to the EP's opinion on China as it is the main
source of information on the subject. It is in direct contact with China on behalf of the EP, therefore
it also in‰uence China's opinions of the EU to some extent.
The rapporteurs system was set up to provide the EP with in-depth views on speciˆc issues.
When the EP feels necessary to comment, reply or object another EU institution's proposal or deci-
sions, it will nominate a MEP as rapporteur to provide reports on the subject. The MEP is usually a
specialist from the committee of the respective area. The rapporteur, working along with any
――
concerned MEPs may draft opinions and investigations for the EP, deliver working documents
and ˆnally reports to the EP to review. In such a context, the rapporteurs' opinions value a lot, as it
is specialist view and provided to the whole EP.
As a conclusion to this section, the European Parliament does not own any power to shape the
EU's foreign policy directly, but it still has a strong interest in the area. It has its own committees
and specialists in foreign relations, and it keeps other institutions and countries informed of its
opinions. It is in‰uential in the foreign policy area as it often tries to restrain other EU institutions
with its budgetary or legislative measures, and it represents the voice of EU member states' people.
In the next section, I will brie‰y discuss how the EU member states compete for in‰uence within
the EU institutions.
EU Member States' Divided Representations
The member states compete with each other for in‰uence internally in order to obtain favorable
outcomes. Countries may either promote certain policies in the decision making process, or com-
promise in one area in exchange for preferable policies in other areas. Regarding the external poli-
cies of the EU, member states compete for in‰uence in a very complicated environment. It is com-
plicated because a third party always has to manage many relations at the same time: relations with
Brussels, relations with an EU member states via Brussels and relations directly to an EU member
states. It is very usual that circumstances require sacriˆces from one relation to improve the rela-
tion in another area. Such complication is convenient to be utilized by non-EU states in some situa-
tions and inconvenient in some others, which will be elaborated in the later section.
The foreign policy of the EU casts great in‰uence to member states' foreign policies, and this
situation causes three problems: ˆrst is that member states may try to halt the establishment of
new policy for their own good; second is that member states may sidestep the established policies
by policies' loopholes; third is that member states may sacriˆce the EU and other member states
for a more favorable position from the third party. In this section I will discuss these three problems
and how they in‰uenced the EU's foreign policy making.
First problem is member states' eŠorts on in‰uencing new policies; these are usually done by the
relatively big member states in the EU, such as France, UK, Germany, Italy or Spain. Other states,
either of small size or new membership of EU, often take no sides in debates. Rather than in‰uenc-
ing the EU policy, they are being `Europeanized'. Of course small countries are not always the `Yes
Man'. Their consents are critical in a consensus decision making process; they often passively
in‰uence policies under various pressures, rather than actively seek to do so.26 Besides the o‹cials
from member states, the o‹cials working at the EU institutions might also be one source of
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in‰uence.
Second problem is that member states of the EU may sidestep the current policies. Lots of poli-
cies have loopholes which can be exploited; the most famous loophole is the EU's arms embargo on
China declared after Tiananmen Incident. Although the EU has an arms embargo on China, many
countries sidestepped the embargo by interpreting it in a minimized range.27 Besides, it is imagina-
ble that consensus is di‹cult to ˆnd among 27 states, therefore it takes very long time for decision
making, from proposal to legislation. One solution to the low-e‹ciency of the EU is to form general
clauses and make it detailed later.28 This leaves rooms for various interpretations too, as well as
enabling China to ˆsh beneˆt at the EU. Just like what has been argued, the EU's `inability to co-
ordinate more closely their respective foreign policy towards China gives Chinese reactions much
leeway and renders European Countries an easy catch'; Chinese found EU `easy to read, easy to
manipulate and di‹cult to take seriously in the long run'.29
Third problem is that member states may sacriˆce the EU policies or other member states' in-
terests for their own goals. In other words, there is a lack of unity among EU member states, and a
lack of uniˆed EU policy orientation. On the negotiation table it is a critical shortcoming for the EU
because even the counter-part has a will to oŠer, the EU ˆnds it hard to generate an idea of what it
wants. Although ˆnally after the Lisbon Treaty, Catherine Ashton managed to answer Kissinger to
his `Phone Call' question, the EU still has a long way to reach real policy uniˆcation.30 In the EU-
skeptic UK, as the 7th report from the House of the Lords, British still found there is `di‹culty in
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deciding whether to work with the EU or individual Member States' on the Chinese side.31
In the wake of the economic recession and ˆnancial crisis, it is especial disadvantageous for the
EU to have the weaknesses discussed in this section. Scholars have pointed the problem out, that
China has been getting sweet deals from Europe just by playing divide and rule in Europe.32 In the
next section, the non-EU stakeholders such as China, US, Japan and Taiwan will be discussed
regarding their in‰uence to EU policy making.
Non-EU Countries as Stakeholders
As the direct participants in the diplomatic interactions with the EU, how non-EU countries
in‰uenced the EU decision making will be discussed in this section. Attention will be paid to EU-
China relation, and how China, the US, Japan and Taiwan are being involved in the EU foreign poli-
cy making process.
As early as during the Cold War, European countries have actively sought to approach China.
Since the US-China rapprochement until 1989 Tiananmen Incident, EU-China relations were
largely economic. The Tiananmen Incident doubled with the end of the Cold War and the following
collapse of the Soviet Union, led the EU to rethink its foreign policy on China. It made human
rights and political reform into EU-China relations, though the importance attached to them is
questionable. China has been recognized as a comprehensive partner to the EU since 1998, and the
EU decided to develop a comprehensive strategic partnership with China in 2003. EU's decision to
lift its arms embargo on China was made in the wish to boost EU-China economic relations, and
until now most of EU's China policies are still made on such basis.
The US has been providing Europe with security since the Second World War. As the traditional
ally of the EU, the US barely interfered in the EU decision making process because ˆrst of all they
share the common interests, values and ideology, and secondly in exchange for security the EU has
been making pro-US policies automatically. Nonetheless since the Iraq War and the EU debate on
lifting the arms embargo on China, there is an obvious trans-Atlantic divergence in foreign policy
making. Especially lifting the arms embargo on China, the EU might put the US military in direct
confrontation to European military products and technology. Scholars argued that it is unbelievable
of the EU to lift the embargo, the Europe cannot be trusted anymore, and it is time to repair the
trans-Atlantic relation.33 Although the US managed the crisis by intensive lobbying and coercive
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measures from the congress, the case indicated that the EU started cruising on its independent
diplomatic course.
Strategic interests of the US and human rights are the two biggest concerns of the EU when
making foreign policy towards China. However as one of the security concern, Taiwan (Republic of
China; ROC) has not attracted much attention from the EU. The tension at the Taiwan Strait can
be traced back to 1949 the establishment of People's Republic of China (P.R.C.; China), and the
o‹cial involvement of the US was the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, in which the US claimed that it
might protect Taiwan with its military force if necessary.34 On this longstanding tension, judged by
the increasingly close tie between China and Taiwan, some politicians of the EU member states do
not seem to believe there is possibility of military confrontation between China and Taiwan or the
US.35 Even at the peak of Taiwan Strait Tension―which was the ratiˆcation of Anti-Secession Law
―the French leader still claimed that the law was in line with One China policy.36
If Taiwan cannot be recognized as of great importance to EU-China relation and US-China ten-
sion, Japan can hardly be recognized as relevant. The only tension between China and Japan is the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute, a very small issue but somehow developed in recent years. Despite
of its probability to trigger the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, very few if
any thinks there is going be a China-Japan war over it. However Japanese are still very concerned
about EU's arms embargo on China, because Chinese government is not quite transparent on its
military spending and build-up.37 So far in Brussels, Japanese lobbyists are quite active in persuad-
ing EU to give up lifting its embargo on China.
As a conclusion to this section, it can be seen that the US has been extensively involved in East
Asian security issues―Taiwan, Japan, not to mention Korean Peninsula and East China Sea―and
it is why the US has been very critical with the EU's idea of lifting its arms embargo on China. The
EU on the contrary, has no commitment to East Asian security and essentially only takes pressure
from the US. In the next section, the major tool of in‰uencing the EU decision making, lobbying
groups will be introduced.
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Lobbying Groups
Lobbying group, lobbying activity and lobbyists are quite usual norms of interactions between
economic or political entities. Being widely associated with the image of nepotism, bribery and
manipulations, they are actually on the contrary: although it is di‹cult to regulate and record lob-
bying activities, they allow diŠerent groups and interests to be represented and in‰uence policy
making, and thereafter make policies better serve its purpose. In this section, what lobbying is, how
and why lobbying matters will be introduced.
As some scholar indicated, there is no proper deˆnition of lobbying yet; Joos referred to any cor-
poration's interest representation to the government as lobbying.38 However this deˆnition ignored
a government, a NGO and public institution's in‰uence to another government. Therefore in this
paper, any activity trying to in‰uence the EU will be counted as lobbying activity, which ranges
from demonstration on the streets, to mass media exposure, to an ambassador to ambassador
conversation.
Speciˆcally regarding the commercial lobbying, there is a tendency of politicization of lobbying.
Interests groups started from economic issues at the very beginning of the EU history. However as
EU is becoming more and more open for any in‰uence, it became possible for individuals and
organizations to interfere into foreign policy, public policy and social issues. From rough statistics,
until 2011, there are 313 corporates, 823 EU associations of the professions, 372 citizen interest
groups, 226 regions (which count mission groups of countries in), 51 think tanks, 125 law ˆrms,
200 public aŠairs consultants and hundreds of other groups having o‹ces at Brussels, trying to
extend their in‰uences to the EU.39 The lobbyists in total may be comprised by up to 15,000 heads
count. Simply counting the entrance passes issued by the European Parliament in 2010, which were
clearly identiˆed as `accredited lobbyists', the number could go to 4695.40 Therefore it is hard to
clarify the total number of lobbying activities, but easy to imagine the magnitude and intensity of it.
It is casting great impact on policy making.
Regarding in‰uencing foreign policy making of the EU particularly, I intend to classify lobbying
groups into three by their diŠerent identities, which are public lobbying groups, governmental
lobbying groups and commercial lobbying groups. Public lobbying may include a demonstration, a
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NGO representation and etc. governmental lobbying groups or lobbyists are majorly EU member
states o‹cials, a non-EU country's mission group at Brussels and embassy at an EU member
states. Commercial lobbying groups are any domestic manufacturers, aiming at foreign markets.
There are two routes to in‰uence EU foreign policy; ˆrst one is that all these groups directly make
eŠorts at in‰uencing EU, second one is that they may try to cast impact to EU via member states.
In the next section, how EU institutions and member states were in‰uenced will be brie‰y
discussed as case studies.
EU Arms Embargo on China
The EU's arms embargo on China is one of the cases that caused great division both among the
EU member states and between EU-US alliances. As the political system, ideology and core value
of China are totally diŠerent to western countries, how to approach China without sacriˆces of
allies is a thorny task for pro-China member states of the EU as well as to the EU as a whole. In this
section a discussion will be contributed to how the EU failed to deal with its embargo on China and
how it was in‰uence during the process.
The EU had great di‹culty at coordinating member states for a uniˆed stance, such as on the
Iraq War during 2002-2003. As the drivers of the EU, France and Germany posed great opposition
to the war while the UK and Spain was supportive to the US initiative of the war. The US went
alone on the war and Iraq War debate ended up with a divided Europe. However, the war led to
another two important developments: ˆrst was that the EU realized that there should be a uniˆed
foreign policy of the EU; second was that pro-war countries suŠered from national pressure and
external criticism, and consequently started repairing their relations to mainstream EU countries.
It is in this background, the lifting the arms embargo issue emerged. At the time the 15 member
states had a consensus to push for lifting the arms embargo, despite of the potential con‰ict be-
tween China and the US. The conventional pro-China leader, France argued that the embargo
should be lifted unconditionally. Human rights were valued by Nordic countries but it was only in-
cluded into conditions of lifting. Even the UK, the most trusted ally of the US supported lifting the
embargo. The UK informed the US that it will not openly support the lifting, but if the proposal
comes to the table the UK will give its approval.41 The UK's stance indicated that it was trying to
be part of EU rather than simply a supporter of Atlanticism.
The uniˆed stance on the lifting terriˆed the US. Some scholar argued that even thinking about
lifting the embargo would hurt the EU-US relation, how could some EU member states proposed to
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do it.42 The US waged great lobbying activity as well as public propaganda to reverse the situation.
The EU member states resisted the US pressure at ˆrst; some argued that it would a fool of the US
to interfere EU politics.43 The wind turned after the US asserted to take retaliation on the EU; the
US congress suggested to embargo EU companies for endangering the US army.44 The EU,
already wavered, tried to take the embargo pressure but its eŠort was crashed by China passing the
Anti-Secession Law. The passage of the law put the EU in a particularly di‹cult position as the law
argued that China would possibly unify Taiwan by force; the member states' unity was soon broken
down and EU decided to postpone the discussion on lifting the embargo.
The lifting arms embargo discussion was marked as a great failure of the EU. On one hand, the
EU failed to honor its promise to China, which was to lift the embargo, and consequently frustrated
its relation with China. On the other, it drew great doubts from the US for being a trustworthy ally,
as the EU consecutively went against the US national interests. This failure raised the question that
how EU was in‰uenced by relevant actors. China and the US, as well as some others casted im-
pacts on EU decision making process, but it is still hard to tell which actor was the most in‰uential.
It seemed that the US won by stopping the EU from lifting the embargo; but the consensus system
favored the US during the process. In the next section, a case of how the system favored China will
be discussed.
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
Regarding the EU's arms embargo on China, the most ideal outcome expected by the US is that
the EU strengthens and legalizes its embargo on China. In a less ideal situation, the US wants the
EU to keep the embargo. If still not possible, at least the US needs the EU to provide a mature
arms control system to manage its arms exports to China. As previously discussed that on issues
related to foreign policies, there needs to be a consensus for policies to become eŠective; therefore
the US utilized this requirement, successfully broke the EU's consensus on lifting the arms
embargo and thusly stop it from becoming the least ideal situation. However if the US wants the
embargo to become its most desired form, it is as hard as lifting the embargo for that the US can
never see a strengthened embargo without a consensus among member states. This eŠort has been
seen in the making of the EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. In this section, the consensus
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dilemma on the Code will be discussed.
When the EU proposed to lift the embargo, it suggested the EU has a better replacement for the
embargo, which is the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Under the control of the Code, the
quality and the quantity of the EU's arms export to China will not be expecting a signiˆcant
increase, as what it promised.45 It should be noted that the Code is not targeting at China, but
strongly related to and often motivated by China. The arms embargo on China was one of the
reasons why the EU started to form its arms control system. After the Tiananmen Incident and the
introduction of the embargo, the EU realized that there was no criterion for arms control at the EU
level, therefore started looking into arms control. As time goes by, there was the will to lift the
embargo; therefore as the substitute measure of the embargo, how the Code could work as the
embargo has been widely discussed. Nevertheless, despite of that discussions often involve China,
eventually the Code still applies to any non-EU member states.
Although by the time of the proposal of lifting the embargo, both of the embargo and the Code
were only politically binding, the argument was valid as the original arms embargo on China was no
more than a brief sentence, but the Code was a much more developed system with eight detailed
criteria. The EU's Code of Conduct is also not the only arms control policy. Each country has its
own arms export policy, which might serve as a double insurance.
However the US did not see the Code of Conduct in the same way with the EU, and the Code did
seem leaky in some aspects. Some decision making process of the Code indicated that the Code was
not intended to have much binding power, and lifting the arms embargo could still cause increase of
arms exports to China. Such as in 1999, the exchange of information by the Code was proposed as a
conˆdential measure of management, which is not accessible to external users, therefore protect
sellers and buyers of arms; it only became public under the European Parliament's strong pressure.
During 2004, there was once a discussion to strengthen the Code by enforcing exchange of informa-
tion on arms export to former banned countries. The plan did not manage it onto the Code, as it
failed to get through debates on lifting the EU arms embargo on China.46 The Code was ˆnally
legalized and transformed into a Common Position; nonetheless it articulated that exchange of
information will only be conducted when an arms sale proposal is denied.
The problems of the Code, along with other worries of the US, led the US and its allies to a huge
campaign of wavering the EU's position on lifting the embargo. As one can see, it takes huge
eŠorts to either stop lifting the embargo or realize it. How such eŠorts have been observed will be
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presented in the next section.
Possibility of Observing and Regulating Lobbying: a Special Case
As previously discussed, the scale of lobbying is huge yet lobbying itself is hard to deˆne; obser-
vation and regulation of lobbying activities is merely a mission impossible. However there are still
ways to follow the lobbying activities, and sketch out some patterns of lobbying. In this section how
lobbying activities have been observed could be discussed.
The di‹culty of tracking data sets may vary according to diŠerent types of lobbying activities.
Demonstrations, public aŠairs, social interests, lobbying activities like such usually leave records at
o‹ces of NGOs, NPOs and mass media. Lobbying activity for commercial purposes is less transpar-
ent to the public, but the EU is trying to regulate and balance the information asymmetry between
companies, companies and the public, therefore some data can be accessed via EU registers. The
commercial lobbying and public lobbying can also be cross-checked from similar institutions, as
they often cooperate and exchange information. However, to the last genre, governmental lobbying
is the most in‰uential to policy making yet very hard to trace. Governmental lobbying is recorded
by political institutions and protected by 30 years rules, which is not available in short-term.
To make up the shortcomings of data and track governmental lobbying activities, there are
several methods available. The ˆrst tool is media resources. Media includes website, television,
newspapers. Journalists often cover stories on o‹cials and companies, which composes one part of
ˆrst hand data. Second source is similar to the ˆrst one, which is the publication of governments
and companies. It often includes the o‹cial opinions which most accurately describe the attitudes
of them. O‹cial databases also belong to this category. Third method is interview. Direct inter-
views to o‹cials can extract most original information and sometimes classiˆed or unnoticed de-
tails. Last but not least, leaked ˆles are also playing an important part of data. Since the November
of 2010, organizations led by Wikileaks started to publish classiˆed embassy cables along with
some other o‹cial documents. The number of ˆles exceeds 250,000, which provides a rich pool of
information on how governmental lobbying activities happened between the US and another coun-
try. The credibility of the leaked ˆles is highly trustworthy; the Guardian newsagent has veriˆed
the cables and conˆrmed that information source is Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet)47.
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Conclusion
As the European Union is a giant multi-tasking complexity, this paper was dedicated to break
down the organization and analyze its functions by parts. The European Commission, the European
Council and the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the EU member states,
non-EU countries and lobbying groups were analyzed in tandem. Cases of the EU's arms embargo
on China and Code of Conduct on Arms Exports were used to demonstrate the decision making
process of the EU. The possibility of lobbying activity observation and regulation was discussed as
special case for further studies. The in‰uences of US and China were discussed; in most parts of
the EU the US in‰uence has been weakened and counter-balanced by pro-China actors, though es-
sentially the US is still more in‰uential than China to the EU.
The EU as an entity can be recognized as a rational choice maker, though in some circumstances
it failed to make rational choice as a result of internal political struggle or external interference. A
proper judgment should be made case by case. In case of Qualiˆed Majority Voting among the
European Council or the Council, a rational choice is very likely to be made; in case of a consensus
with the EP, rational choice is less likely to appear.
The Commission represents the authority of the EU. Its opinion has greater in‰uence to small
member states than to large ones, and its vice president, the High Representative is one of the key
to the decision making of EU's foreign policy. Its power has been increasingly challenged over the
years, and there is also criticism saying the Commission sometimes took sides during debates.
The European Council and the Council are two strongly connected institutions. Regarding the
China policy of the EU, the European Council has been guiding the EU to promote a comprehensive
strategic partnership with China, and the Council has been implementing this policy by its Foreign
AŠairs Council. It should be noticed that the Foreign AŠairs Council is diŠerent with the European
External Action Service; the EEAS is independent, assists the High Representative and works on
the last details of foreign policies.
The EP's main function is supervision over other EU institutions and legislation. It has very
limited power over policy making but great interests in it. It has used legislative tools to restrain
the Commission and two Councils, as well as expand its own power. Regarding foreign policy, the
EP has its Foreign AŠairs Committee and Delegations to non-EU countries, which represent the
EP internationally.
As a result of lack of common interests, the EU member states often compete for in‰uence at the
EU level in order to implement their favorable policies. It sometimes confuses non-EU states that
member states and the EU pursue diŠerent policies. This situation made it di‹cult when a non-EU
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country tries to promote a policy, but a divided EU also enabled non-EU countries to play divide
and rule in the Europe arena. Two typical cases are the EU lifting its arms embargo on China and
the legalization of the EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The US broke the required consen-
sus and stopped the EU from lifting its embargo on China; and some pro-China countries' objec-
tions changed the clauses of the Code and delayed the legalization of it.
To track and analyze further into the EU decision making process of foreign policy and China
policy, data has been one major obstacle. Regarding to the di‹culty to obtain information within
recent 30 years, media information, databases, interviews, and leaked documents can be used to
produce a more complete picture of interactions between actors.
